Innovation in digital technology has allowed rapid growth in mobile telephone and Internet adoption among consumers. The implication underlying the high rates of subscription growth is that consumers generally place a high valuation on telecommunication services. Moreover, since mobile telephone and Internet are predominantly telecommunication services, it is reasonable to presume that the network effect may be largely responsible for this growth. The implication of the network effect, where the consumer's valuation of service increases with the size of the network is that subscription growth is endogenous. However, to date there have been few attempts to measure the change in consumer welfare as networks increase. Following Hausman (1981), this paper measures the change in consumer surplus based on the compensating variations approach. The result is an annual measure of the change in consumer surplus for the representative consumer for the OECD region. In addition, the approach reveals whether marginal consumer surplus is a decreasing or increasing function of network size. Measurement of the change in consumer welfare thus provides an additional tool for public policy analysis.
telecommunications service network effect. Section III reports model parameter estimates based on annual OECD data for 30 Member States for the period 1996 through 2000. CV values are constructed from the parameter estimates and discussed. The services considered are fixed-line and mobile telephony, and the Internet. Section IV concludes.
II. Methodology
A feature of electronic communication networks is that consumers receive more utility the larger is the subscriber base. That is, a consumer's welfare increases monotonically with the network size (Squire 1973; Rohlfs 1974) . Accordingly, the presence of a network effect impacts on both current subscriber and marginal non-subscriber welfare. That is, for subscribers, network subscription growth provides greater consumer welfare. Further, marginal non-subscribers are more likely to subscribe, at current prices, the larger is network subscription. To identify the increase in consumer welfare due to a price fall then requires the separation of any consumer welfare gain due to a movement along the subscription demand curve (direct price effect), from any indirect welfare gain originating from network expansion (network externality effect). Hausman (1981) uses the CV method to measure consumer welfare rise in response to a price fall for a non-network good. The change in consumer welfare induced by a network effect is obtained by adapting Hausman's (1997) measure of the change in consumer welfare caused by the introduction of a new good. The consumer welfare change is obtained by treating the prevailing subscription price, before the price change, as the reservation price of a new subscriber, i.e., the price at which she will decide to subscribe. As such, the network's growth leads to a change in the current reservation price.
With the reservation price change identified, the variation to consumer welfare is then calculated.
Compensating Variation and Hausman's approach
A price fall impacts on the demand for any given good in two different ways. First, the price fall has an effect which is equivalent to an income increase, stimulating demand for the good considered and for all other goods (income effect). Second, it makes the consumer demand less for other goods and more for the good considered, the relative price of which is lowered (substitution effect). In order to separate the income effect from the substitution effect, consider a two-step process. In the first step (substitution effect), price is lowered from its initial to its final level, while the income effect is controlled by lowering income simultaneously with price, so as to hold utility constant. In the second step (income effect), price remains unchanged whereas the initial level of income is restored. By definition, the income removed in the first step, and then restored in the second step, is the compensating variation, CV. The CV is interpreted as the amount that the consumer should be compensated if he were not to benefit from the price fall, i.e., CV is the exact measure of the change in consumer welfare caused by a price fall. Defining the compensated demand function as the hypothetical demand that would prevail under compensating income variation (during the first step), CV measure is simply the area A in Fig. 1, viz. , the area lying to the left of the compensated demand curve, between the initial and the final price lines, P 0 and P 1 . The difficulty is that compensated demand functions are not readily obtainable from market data. Only uncompensated demand functions are observed, indicating equilibrium demand at given prices and income. Now, using the uncompensated demand curve instead of the compensated demand curve leads to an inexact measure of welfare change. In particular, this measure includes the income effect, and based on consumer surplus variation SV, results in the area A+B in Fig. 1 , rather than on the compensating variation CV. A sufficient condition for CS and SV to be equivalent is that the marginal utility of income is constant, which is not generally consistent with observed behaviour 1 .
The measurement of CV, not SV, is thus required in order to obtain a proper assessment of welfare change. Hausman (1981) employed the microeconomic theory of consumer behaviour to derive the unobserved compensated demand curve from the observed uncompensated demand curve. From the observed demand function, and Roy's identity (see Appendix), the expenditure function 2 is first derived, i.e., the variable income the consumer must be allocated when price varies in order to keep her utility constant. Then, the compensated demand function is obtained as the derivative of the expenditure function with respect to price. Finally, CV, i.e., the exact measure of welfare variation due to a price change, is calculated.
The case of network goods
Next, Hausman's approach must be adapted to the context of network goods. Following Madden et al. (2004) , an uncompensated network demand equation system is first specified as:
where is the demand for service i at time (defined in terms of the size of network ), 
implies the anticipated fall in the price of network induces a current period increase in subscription for network . A permanent price fall implies a larger increase in current subscription than for a temporary price fall, since the permanent price fall combines a fall in current and all future prices.
Following Hausman's approach (see Appendix), the exact measure, CV i,t , of change in consumer welfare due to a price change from P i,t to P i,t+1 , is then calculated as:
The compensating variation CV i,t reflects a movement along the compensated demand curve and reflects the direct price effect on welfare.
In order to assess the network effect from (2), one has to determine the change ,1
NN in reservation subscription price which produces a one unit increase in network size, .
For new subscribers, the size of the network is just large enough to induce them to join at the prevailing subscription price. Assuming network size is perfectly observable, and subscribers are able to join at any time, the prevailing network subscription price is equal to new subscriber's reservation price 
Equation (3) measures the change in welfare at time t due to the price adjustment caused by a unitary network increase.
III. OECD Consumer Surplus Change
Biannual rental price data are required to estimate (2) and (3). These data are collected for 30 OECD Member Country markets for 1996, 1998 and 2000 from the OECD Communications Outlook (1997, 1999, 2001, 2003) . Annual quantity ( telephone subscription price provides the most direct benefit to consumers after 2000, followed by that for fixed-line service. Table III shows the indirect (or network externality) effect on welfare in fixed-line and mobile telephony and Internet service, respectively. CV estimates indicate that the benefit derived from a small increase in network size is large relative to that for the direct price effect. 5 The presence of unobserved components means that two-stage instrumental variables estimation is required. Past network size is an endogenous variable because of the dependence of network size on the unobserved components. However, caution is required when implementing instrumental variables since, as Nelson and Startz (1990) warn, the use of lagged values as instruments when estimating stochastic Euler equations can lead to bias. Thus, instruments for network size are restricted to future access and use prices. Particular care is taken to ensure instruments are good predictors of network size. The resulting equations are estimated in Limdep 8.0 using the unbalanced panel data set described above. Finally, Internet service expenditure is a relatively small proportion of communications expenditure compared to that for mobile telephony. Accordingly, the network effect induced by increased network size is less constrained than that for mobile telephony. However, since the subscription price includes the fixed-line subscription charge, it too is relatively constrained when compared to fixed-line access. These findings suggest that concentrating solely on the welfare impact of price falls yields an underestimate of consumer benefit. That is, while the direct effect from a price fall in 1 1 telecommunications networks matters, indirect benefit from subsequent network expansion is also important. This finding has important consequences for the conduct of universal service policy.
IV. Conclusion
This study uses Hausman's (1981) CV approach to measure the direct consumer welfare change from a price fall and an indirect network externality effect. The study demonstrates a method to obtain exact estimates of welfare change. Once econometric price and income parameter estimates are obtained the corresponding change in consumer welfare is calculated. Additionally, this study demonstrates the importance of controlling for the network effect to obtain an accurate assessment of the total impact on consumer welfare. Estimates indicate a direct increase in welfare from a subscription price fall is at most 0.2% of income. However, larger indirect welfare increases occur via a network effect. Surprisingly, mobile telephony welfare increases appear to provide the smallest improvement. However, this result is explained by a high mobile subscription price when compared to fixed-line telephony and Internet service prices. That is, the relatively high mobile subscription price constrains the network effect. Finally, study findings support competition policy designed to place downward pressure on subscription prices. The study provides indirect justification for the continuation of universal service policy.
While the empirical estimates of CV for telephony and Internet networks contained in this study are revealing, it is important to note that the underlying source of welfare gains differ by network. That is, the network effects linked to (fixed-line and mobile) point-to-point communication services differ from that due primarily to information services. Conversely, information service growth is related to the installed base of terminals, in particular connected PCs. Accordingly, fixed and mobile telephones mostly generate communications network effects and, so far, few information service effects (which could change with the emergence of the 3 rd generation mobile telephony and growth in mobile data markets). Additionally, the Internet generates mostly information service network effects, typically through e-mail, the dominant but not exclusive use. This latter network externality is very important because the quantity and quality of data available on the Web is highly correlated with the size of network subscriber base. Further, it is reasonable to expect that this Internet communications externality will become increasingly important. Finally, as the model cannot distinguish these effects, the results are likely to underestimate the true impact of Internet network growth on CV.
Appendix : Hausman's approach and proof of equation (2)
Consider the dynamic and deterministic demand system specified by Madden et al. (2004) ,
is consumer demand for network at time , under price level 
The linear uncompensated demand function, , derives from its generating quadratic indirect utility function, , through Roy's identity :
Following Hausman (1981) , to enable a valid welfare comparison to be made, before and after a price change, requires that the consumer remain at constant utility U t , i.e., on a same indifference curve. If price of service i departs from at time t, to remain on the same indifference curve requires that, t i P , simultaneously, income departs from . Denoting the expenditure function, i.e. the current income associated with current price along a constant utility path, Roy's identity implies:
The solution to differential equation (A4) is : 
in which the constant of integration (reflecting the invariance of utility) derives from the initial condition :
Hence, finally:
(A7) J T J J From the expenditure function , the compensated demand function is derived as:
Now consider a virtual transition from time t to time t + 1, in which the price falls from to and income is simultaneously lowered from to t i P ,
, in order to make the consumer insensitive to the price fall. The difference, or 'compensating variation', , is the income reduction which offsets the price fall benefit to the consumer.
Conversely, is a measure of the consumer's welfare gain due to the price reduction from to .
The explicit expression of , as in equation (2), then derives from (A7) and (A8), i.e.:
